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INTRODUCTION
Human subjects research has a shameful history of abuses
committed against institutionalized people. Decades after the
Nuremburg court condemned Nazi doctors to death for experi-
menting on prisoners in concentration camps, researchers in the
United States continued to expose prisoners to measles, malaria,
radioactive isotopes, and other painful and damaging interven-
tions.1 On his first visit to the Holmesburg prison in Pennsylva-
nia, Dr. Albert Kligman reported seeing in this captive population
"acres of skin" on which he could conduct dermatological experi-
ments, including toxins that left prisoners scarred and blistered.2
The revelation of studies like these prompted public outcry and
government action. A national commission tasked by Congress
with examining the use of prisoners in research concluded that
the conditions of their confinement render prisoners highly vul-
nerable to coercion and exploitation.' Federal agencies, including
the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") and the
Bureau of Prisons, acted on these findings by imposing special
rules designed to protect prisoners from research abuses.4
Yet both federal regulations and the research ethics literature
have overlooked another captive population that requires special
• Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law.
•* Professor, Center for Bioethics, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.
1. Keramet Reiter, Comment, Experimentation on Prisoners: Persistent Dilemmas in
Rights and Regulations, 97 CAL. L. REV. 501, 510-12 (2009).
2. Id. at 501-02.
3. See infra Part I.
4. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-306 (2015); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS,
PROGRAM STATEMENT No. 6031.04, PATIENT CARE § 45 (2014); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT No. 1070.07, RESEARCH § 10 (1999).
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protections: involuntarily committed patients. The regulations
that govern much federally funded research,' commonly called
"the Common Rule," exclude these patients by defining "prison-
ers" as encompassing only persons confined through the criminal
justice system.6 Yet these patients are similarly susceptible to
unethical research practices. Like prisoners, involuntarily com-
mitted patients are confined against their will, rendering them
isolated and dependent on institutional authorities. Moreover, the
length of their confinement is largely determined by authorities
who at least authorize, if not conduct, any research patients may
be asked to join.
Properly applied, the general ethical principles governing hu-
man subjects research should bar the recruitment of involuntarily
committed patients for most research. As with prisoners, these
patients' conditions of confinement present an overwhelming bar-
rier to voluntary consent, and their recruitment will rarely be
consistent with the interests of justice. However, the lack of ex-
press protections for this population in federal regulations gov-
erning human subjects research-together with the significant
gaps in the applicability of those regulations-leaves these pa-
tients at risk.
A 2006 report by the Institute of Medicine recognized that the
Common Rule's narrow definition of "prisoner" improperly ex-
cludes some populations that are subject to the same pressures as
inmates of correctional facilities.7 The Institute recommended
broadening that definition to extend the Common Rule's special
protections "to the fuller population of individuals who are under
restricted liberty and, therefore, face potentially greater risks
than the general population when participating in research."8 But
while the Institute's report emphasized that involuntarily com-
mitted patients face very similar circumstances as prisoners, and
therefore require strong ethical safeguards, the authors did not
include these patients in their proposed expanded definition. The
5. 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2016).
6. Id. § 46.303(c).
7. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L AcADs., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH
INVOLVING PRISONERS 4-5 (2007) [hereinafter IOM REPORT].
8. Id. at 101.
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authors concluded that the special circumstances of patients un-
der civil commitment orders were outside the scope of their
charge and warranted separate consideration.9
This article takes up that task and argues that patients con-
fined to government custody through the process of civil commit-
ment should be afforded the same research protections as persons
incarcerated through the criminal justice system. Applying the
Common Rule's special protections for prisoners would reduce the
risks to which these patients are exposed and would limit their
participation to research that offers benefits directly to subjects
or to involuntarily committed patients as a group.
Part I relates several stories of involuntarily committed pa-
tients who were recruited into studies posing serious risks. Part
II draws on these cases to argue that the involuntary commit-
ment of these patients leaves them vulnerable to unethical
treatment by researchers. Their inherently coercive circumstanc-
es present an overwhelming obstacle to voluntary consent, and
their captive status makes them attractive targets for research
that could be performed using less vulnerable subjects.
Part III argues that most research on this patient population is
improper under generally applicable principles of informed con-
sent and fair subject selection. However, existing protections have
proved insufficient to prevent unethical recruitment of these pa-
tients. Accordingly, Part IV builds on the Institute of Medicine's
call for expanding the definition of "prisoner" in federal regula-
tions, arguing that civilly committed patients should be included
within its ambit and that the Common Rule's protections should
be applied to all research involving involuntarily confined sub-
jects.
I. RESEARCHERS HAVE SUBJECTED INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED
PATIENTS TO UNETHICAL TREATMENT
Involuntary commitment can take many forms. Every state has
laws empowering law enforcement officers to temporarily detain
people experiencing psychiatric crises on an emergency basis."0
9. Id. at 26 n.1.
10. BRIAN STETTIN ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., MENTAL HEALTH
COMMITMENT LAWS: A SURVEY OF THE STATES 14 (2014) [hereinafter STETTIN ET AL., TAC
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Most states allow such individuals to be detained without a court
order for up to seventy-two hours (sometimes referred to as a "72-
hour hold") so that medical staff can seek to stabilize them and
evaluate whether they require long-term commitment.1
State laws also empower courts to order an individual to be
confined to a mental institution on a long-term basis. Standards
for involuntary in-patient commitment vary considerably among
the states. Thirty-three states have statutes that authorize courts
to involuntarily commit adults for substance abuse. 12 Twenty
states and the federal government have adopted statutes allowing
sex offenders to be civilly committed after completing their crimi-
nal sentences. 3 All states have inpatient commitment statutes
that empower courts to confine individuals on the basis of severe
mental illness. The most permissive states, like Arizona, adopt a
"need for treatment" standard under which courts may confine an
individual upon "a finding that the person's mental illness pre-
vents him from seeking help on a voluntary basis and, if not
treated, will cause him severe suffering and harm his health.' 4
At the other end of the spectrum, under the laws of states like Al-
abama, a court may only confine a mentally ill person who pre-
sents a "real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or
others."'5
As an alternative to inpatient commitment, forty-two states
and the District of Columbia have outpatient commitment laws
that allow courts to order certain mentally ill persons "to adhere
to a specific program of outpatient treatment as a condition of
remaining in the community."'6 A variation on this practice is
Minnesota's "stay of commitment" option, under which a court
SURVEY], http://www.treatmentadvocacyceter.org/storage/documents/2014-state-survey-ab
ridged.pdf.
11. Id.
12. Paul P. Christopher et al., Nature and Utilization of Civil Commitment for Sub-
stance Abuse in the United States, 43 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 313, 315 (2015).
13. Fredrick E. Vars, Delineating Sexual Dangerousness, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 855, 857
(2013).
14. STETTIN ET AL., TAC SURVEY, supra note 10, at 7; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501
(2016).
15. ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4 (2016).
16. STETTIN ET AL., TAC SURVEY, supra note 10, at 10; Candice T. Player, Involuntary
Outpatient Commitment: The Limits of Prevention, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 161-62
(2015).
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can decline to enforce an inpatient commitment order as long as
the individual follows his treatment plan. 7 Under this procedure,
the patient can avoid being confined to a mental institution as
long he complies with the court's conditions regarding treat-
ment.'
There is little data regarding how often institutionalized men-
tal patients are used as research subjects. 9 What exists instead
are scattered data points and anecdotal cases brought to light
when an outside party becomes aware of abuses and has both the
will and the resources to expose them. For example, a 1978 report
by a national commission studying research protections deter-
mined that at that time the National Institute of Mental Health
supported one hundred projects involving mentally ill inpatients,
and the Veterans Administration supported an additional 230
such studies. ° The report did not state how many of the subjects
in these studies were involuntarily committed. In T.D. v. New
York State Office of Mental Health, a disability rights group chal-
lenged regulations passed by the State of New York's Office of
Mental Health ("OMH") governing research on incompetent pa-
tients residing at OMH-operated facilities.2' The court's opinion
noted that as of 1996 there were approximately 400 such studies
involving "more than minimal risk."22 Again, however, it is not
clear how many of the subjects in those studies were involuntari-
ly confined.2'
17. MINN. STAT. § 253B.095 (2009).
18. Id.
19. The Institute of Medicine observed a similar dearth of data for prisoners, noting
"[t]here were no comprehensive reviews and no central repository of information about the
amount and different types of research involving prisoners." IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at
59; see also Elyn R. Saks et al., Proxy Consent to Research: The Legal Landscape, 8 YALE J.
HEALTH POLY L. & ETHICS 37, 40 (2008) ('There is no empirical data regarding the
amount of research currently being conducted with decisionally impaired subjects.").
20. NATL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. No. (OS)
78-0006, RESEARCH INVOLVING THOSE INSTITUTIONALIZED AS MENTALLY INFIRM 36, 39
(1978) [hereinafter 1978 NAT'L COMM'N REP.].
21. 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
22. Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
23. While the parties in that case agreed that the legal challenge would "directly and
immediately affect only a very small percentage" of those studies, it is not clear whether
that is because very few of those studies involved incompetent subjects, or few of those
studies were federally funded, and therefore not within the scope of the legal challenge. Id.
10452017]
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This lack of information precludes systematic assessments of
the extent to which involuntarily committed patients are being
treated unethically by researchers or are being systematically
targeted for inclusion in research because of their easy availabil-
ity. However, specific examples of research abuses involving these
patients illustrate how their circumstances can render them vul-
nerable to coercion and exploitation.
A. Louis Smith, a.k.a. "John Doe"
Until recently, the best-known example of the perils of using
involuntarily committed patients in research was described in the
case of Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health.24 In
1972, the Michigan state legislature awarded two researchers
funding to undertake a study using an experimental psychosur-
gery to address uncontrollable aggression.25 The study protocol
called for the recruitment of twenty-four involuntarily confined
sexual psychopaths to serve as subjects in the study, which would
compare the effect of brain surgery to the effect of the drug cy-
proterone acetate in altering the flow of male hormones.26
However, the researchers were only able to identify one inmate
who met their criteria: Louis Smith. Identified in the Michigan
Circuit Court opinion as "John Doe," Smith had been confined to
the Ionia State Hospital for seventeen years.2" Although the study
was intended to compare two interventions, the researchers
planned to proceed with brain surgery on Smith alone28 until a
lawyer discovered the proposed surgery and filed suit to stop it.
29
Although Smith insisted during his confinement that he consent-
ed voluntarily to the surgery, once released from confinement he
withdrew his consent.3" Testimony at trial revealed that he had
consented to the procedure "partly because of his effort to show
24. Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2455, 13 CRL 2455
(Mich. 1973).
25. Id. at 2453.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Candace J. Fabri, Constitutional Law-An Involuntarily Detained Mental Pa-
tient's Informed Consent Is Invalid for Experimental Psychosurgery, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
526, 529 (1973).
30. Kaimowitz, 13 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA), at 2453-54.
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the doctors in the hospital that he was a cooperative patient."'"
The Michigan court barred researchers from proceeding with the
surgery, concluding that the "inherently coercive" institutional
environment precluded voluntary consent to invasive proce-
dures."
B. Dan Markingson
The case of Dan Markingson is worth relating in detail, both
because it is recent and because it illustrates many facets of what
makes the recruitment of involuntarily committed patients so
problematic in today's research environment. Markingson's
treatment has also been the subject of investigations by the State
of Minnesota's Legislative Auditor and the Association for the Ac-
creditation of Human Research Protection Programs, both of
which released damning reports in 2015."
In 2003, Markingson was twenty-six years old and living in Los
Angeles. 4 When Dan's mother, Mary Weiss, came to visit him
that summer, she discovered he was mentally disturbed. He made
inscrutable comments and had "encircled his bed with wooden
posts, salt, candles, and money, which he said would protect him
from evil spirits. He showed her a spot on the carpet that he said
the aliens had burned."'5
Mary eventually persuaded Markingson to come back to St.
Paul, Minnesota, where his condition continued to deteriorate. He
believed people could cast spells and read minds, and that some
31. Id. at 2454.
32. Id.
33. OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, STATE OF MINN., A CLINICAL DRUG STUDY AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHIATRY: THE DAN MARKINGSON CASE 5
(2015) [hereinafter LEGIS. AUDITOR REP.], www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/sreview/Marking
son.pdf; ASS'N FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HUMAN RESEARCH PROT. PROGRAMS, AN
EXTERNAL REVIEW OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO RESEARCH WITH ADULTS WHO
MAY LACK DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY 67 n.8 (2015) [hereinafter AAHRPP REP.], http://
research.umn.edu/advancehrp/documents/final-report.pdf.
34. Carl Elliott, The Deadly Corruption of Clinical Trials, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 13,
2010, 5:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/environment/2010/09/dan-markingson-drug-
trial-astrazeneca.
35. Id.
2017] 1047
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people might be "hybrids" who were not entirely human.36 Even
more alarming, he believed the Illuminati were planning a
"storm" of mass murder in which he planned to participate, writ-
ing in an email "I'm especially eager to attend this storm and
SLAY those who deserve slaying. I will choose victims immediate-
ly... I HAVE NO EMOTIONAL ATTACHMENTS. I KILL FOR
FUN! !"
'W
On November 12, Mary called the police after Markingson
threatened to kill her. 8 The police took Markingson to Regions
Medical Center in St. Paul, where the medical staff placed him
under a "72 hour hold"-a procedure that allows medical staff to
temporarily confine a patient who is determined to be mentally ill
and to pose a danger to himself or others.39 Regions then trans-
ferred Markingson to Fairview University Medical Center, a
teaching hospital affiliated with the University of Minnesota. °
There, Markingson was treated by an associate professor in the
university's psychiatry department named Dr. Stephen Olson.4
On November 13, Dr. Olson examined Markingson and diagnosed
him with paranoid schizophrenia, noting that he was at a high
risk of acting on his violent delusions. 2 He prescribed Marking-
son the antipsychotic drug Risperdal (risperidone)."3
Dr. Olson determined Markingson was psychotic and danger-
ous, and that he "lack[ed] the capacity to make decisions regard-
ing his medical treatment. ' A court-appointed social worker
shared that assessment, concluding that Markingson did not have
"the capacity to make decisions regarding neuroleptic medica-
tions.""
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 5.
39. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 253B.05 (2016).
40. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 5.
41. Id.
42. JAMES L. JACOBSON, DAKOTA CTY., STATE OF MINN., REP. OF EXAMINER 3 (Nov. 19,
2003) [hereinafter JACOBSON, REP. OF EXAMINER], https://www.scribd.com/document/497
29697/Jacobson-Examiner-Report.
43. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 11.
44. Id.
45. Id.; Rep. of Pre-Petition Screening Team, In re Markingson, No. PX-03-10465
(Minn. Dist. Ct., 1st Jud. Dist. Nov. 17, 2003), http://www.scribd.com/doc/49730113/Pre-
petition-screening-report.
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On November 17, Fairview Hospital initiated proceedings to
have Markingson committed to Anoka Metro Regional Treatment
Center, a long-term state psychiatric facility.46 A district court en-
tered an initial commitment order confining Markingson to Fair-
view, pending a hearing scheduled for the following week.47 On
November 19, while the commitment proceedings were pending
and Markingson was still in Fairview's custody, Dr. Olson ap-
proached Markingson about participating in a clinical trial of an-
tipsychotic drugs called the CAFE study, for "Comparison of
Atypicals in First Episode of Psychosis."4 In addition to being
Markingon's treating physician, Dr. Olson was a principal inves-
tigator for the CAFE study at the University of Minnesota trial
site.49
On November 20, the district court entered an order commit-
ting Markingson to the Anoka facility, but "stayed" that commit-
ment for six months on the condition that he "remain hospital-
ized, cooperate with the treatment plan at Fairview University
Medical Center until medically discharged, and follow all of the
aftercare recommendations of the treatment team."5" Although
Dr. Olson, a social worker, and a clinical psychologist had each
determined that Markingson lacked the capacity to make deci-
sions regarding his own care, the court did not appoint a legal
guardian to make decisions on Markingson's behalf.51
The following day, Markingson's decision-making capacity was
again assessed by Jean Kenney, the study coordinator for the
CAFE study. 2 Although a court-appointed psychologist had ex-
46. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 5.
47. Id.; Order to Confine, to Transport for Examination, Hearing, Appointment of At-
torney, Examiner and Notice, In re Markingson, No. PX-03-10465 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 1st
Jud. Dist. Nov. 17, 2003), https://www.scribd.com/document/49672066/Commitment-
Order.
48. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 5-6; CAFE Comparison of Atypicals in
First Episode of Psychosis, CLINICALTRIALS.Gov, https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT
00034892 (last updated Jan. 3, 2013).
49. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 6.
50. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order for Stayed Commitment at 2, In
re Markingson, No. PX-03-10465 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 1st Jud. Dist. Nov. 20, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Order for Stayed Commitment], https://www.scribd.com/document/l13945040/Stay-of-
Commitment-for-Dan-Markingson; LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 11.
51. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 5, 11.
52. Id. at 11.
20171 1049
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amined Markingson two days earlier and determined that he had
"a substantial disorder of thought" and a "gross impairment of
judgment, behavior, [and] capacity to recognize reality, [or] capac-
ity to reason or understand,""8 Kenney concluded that he had suf-
ficient decision-making capacity to consent to research participa-
tion.54 Under a court order to follow the recommendations of his
caregivers, and threatened with involuntary confinement for non-
compliance, Markingson signed the ten-page informed consent
document and was enrolled in the study.
55
The CAFE study was sponsored by AstraZeneca, and was de-
signed to compare the efficacy of its antipsychotic drug, Seroquel,
against two competing drugs in treating first episode psychosis. 6
AstraZeneca had outsourced management of the study to a con-
tract research organization called Quintiles. The University of
Minnesota was one of twenty-six sites enlisted by Quintiles to re-
cruit 400 subjects experiencing their first psychotic episode to
take one of the three study drugs for a year."
Markingson's recruitment into the CAFE study had several
implications for his treatment. The study was double-blinded and
randomized, meaning Markingson was randomly assigned to one
of the three medications, and neither he nor the researchers knew
which drug he was taking.58 The study protocol
barred subjects from being taken off their assigned drug; it didn't al-
low them to be switched to another drug if their assigned drug was
not working; and it restricted the number of additional drugs sub-
jects could be given to manage side effects and symptoms such as
depression, anxiety, or agitation .... These restrictions meant that
subjects in the CAFE study had fewer therapeutic options than they
would have had outside the study.
59
Enrollment in the study also meant that Markingson's treating
physician, Dr. Olson, was no longer concerned solely with his
53. JACOBSON, REP. OF EXAMINER, supra note 42, at 1, 3; LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra
note 33, at 11.
54. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 11.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 5-6; CAFE Comparison of Atypicals in First Episode of Psychosis, supra
note 48.
57. Elliott, supra note 34.
58. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 5-6.
59. Elliott, supra note 34.
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treatment, but also with his obligations as a principal investiga-
tor.60
Patients experiencing their first episode of psychosis are known
to present a higher risk of killing themselves or others. 61 Accord-
ingly, studies of antipsychotic drugs commonly prohibit recruit-
ment of patients who pose a risk of suicide or violence.62 However,
the CAFE study protocol barred recruitment only of subjects who
were deemed to be at risk of suicide, not homicide.63 Thus not-
withstanding Markingson's threat to kill his mother, he was eli-
gible for the study because he had not threatened to harm him-
self.
64
Although Dr. Olson had prescribed Risperdal to Markingson
upon his admission to Fairview Hospital on December 5, Mark-
ingson was switched to his randomly assigned CAFE study drug,
which was later determined to be Seroquel." Three days after
changing Markingson's medication, Dr. Olson discharged him to a
halfway house for people with mental illness.6 Upon his dis-
charge, Markingson was required to sign an aftercare agreement
that required him to keep his CAFE study appointments and to
continue taking his medications.67 The document warned Mark-
ingson that "[c]onsequences for not following this plan could re-
sult in court commitment to the hospital.
68
Markingson's mother, Mary, was not present when he agreed
to be enrolled in the CAFE study.69 When she learned of his re-
60. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 6.
61. Olav Nielssen & Matthew Large, Rates of Homicide During the First Episode of
Psychosis and After Treatment: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 36
SCHIZOPHRENIA BuLL. 702, 702 (2010); Maurizio Pompili et al., Suicide Risk in First Epi-
sode Psychosis: A Selective Review of the Current Literature, 129 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 1
(2011).
62. Elliott, supra note 34; T. Scott Stroup & John R. Geddes, Randomized Controlled
Trials for Schizophrenia: Study Designs Targeted to Distinct Goals, 34 SCHIZOPHRENIA
BULL. 266, 269 (2008).
63. Elliott, supra note 34.
64. Id.
65. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 6-7.
66. Id. at 6.
67. Aftercare Agreement, In re Markingson, No. PX-03-10465 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 1st
Jud. Dist. Nov. 20, 2008), https://www.scribd.com/doc/54233449[Markings-On-Discharge-
Plan (signed on Dec. 8, 2003).
68. Id.
69. Elliott, supra note 34.
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cruitment, she objected to Dr. Olson.7" However, because Mark-
ingson was an adult and the court had not given her any legal au-
thority to make decisions on his behalf, she had no power to have
her son dismissed from the study. 1 She repeatedly pleaded with
Dr. Olson and Dr. Charles Schulz-another principal investigator
in the CAFE study, as well as the chairman of the university's
psychiatry department-to release him from the study, but they
refused. 2 Her pleas became more urgent as she watched Mark-
ingson's condition deteriorate at the halfway house. 3 She was
alarmed at his agitation, noting "[h]e was so tense, with this
ready-to-explode quality." 4 Although she repeatedly contacted
Markingson's treatment team by phone and by mail, "there is lit-
tle documented evidence that the study team followed up with
her, particularly in a timely way." 5
Although Dr. Olson saw Markingson only six times in the six
months between his admission to Fairview Hospital and his
death, he dismissed Mary's concerns.76 And while he insisted that
Markingson was doing well on his study drug, as Markingson's
"stay of commitment was about to expire, [Dr.] Olson recom-
mended extending it for another six months-the duration of the
CAFE study."77 In support of that recommendation, Dr. Olson ar-
gued Markingson still had "little insight into his mental disorder"
and might "place himself at risk of harm if he were to terminate
his treatment.
7 8
On April 11, 2004, Mary visited Markingson and found him
"out of control., 79 Alarmed, she left a telephone message with
Jean Kenney, the CAFE study coordinator, asking "Do we have to
wait until he kills himself or anyone else before anyone does any-
thing?"' According to the Legislative Auditor's report, 'Weiss's
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 17.
76. Elliott, supra note 34.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 17.
80. Id.
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call on April 11 is not documented in Markingson's progress notes
until four days later, April 15.81 There is no documented evidence
that anyone on the treatment team followed up with her until at
least a week later. 82
On the morning of May 8, 2004, a halfway-house worker found
Markingson's corpse in a bathroom.83 He had used a box cutter to
slash open his abdomen and slice his neck, nearly decapitating
himself.4 He had left a note on his nightstand that read "I left
this experience smiling!"8
C. Robert Huber
Three years after Markingson's death, Dr. Olson again recruit-
ed an involuntarily confined patient into a drug study for which
he was a principal investigator. In 2007, Robert Huber reported
to an emergency room complaining of ringing in his ears, hearing
voices, and anxiety.86 He was transferred to Fairview Riverside
Hospital's psychiatric unit, where the medical team diagnosed
him with paranoid schizophrenia. 7 Huber was confined at Fair-
view Riverside for two weeks, during which time he claims "he re-
ceived daily requests from Dr. Stephen Olson and others in the
[University of Minnesota's] Psychiatry Department to volunteer
for a drug trial involving an experimental medication called
bifeprunox."88 Huber claims he felt coerced to consent to the study
"because he thought Olson would keep him in the hospital until
he did."8 He also claims that Fairview staff used his lack of in-
surance to pressure him to participate, telling Huber "you have a
giant medical bill and if you do the research, you won't have this
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Elliott, supra note 34.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Jeff Baillon, Investigators: U of M Drug Study Criticism Grows, FOx 9 (May 19,
2014), http://www.fox9.com/health/1647039-story.
87. Id.
88. Jeremy Olson, University of Minnesota Admits Missteps In Second Schizophrenia
Drug Study, STAR TRIB. (Minn.) (May 9, 2015, 6:22 PM), http://www.startribune.comlu-
admits-missteps-in-2nd-schizophrenia-drug-study/303143181/.
89. Id.
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giant medical bill."9 That claim appears corroborated by Dr. O1-
son's own records, which indicate that Huber was 'very interest-
ed' in the opportunity to have his medical expenses covered by the
study because of a lack of insurance."'"
Dr. Olson's clinical records indicate Huber expressed concerns
about the safety of the study drug, and that Olson reassured him
that "enough patients have been treated to be more sure of its
safety." 2 In truth, bifeprunox had not been proven safe-part of
the purpose of the study was to establish its safety.93 In fact, the
following month, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") an-
nounced that it would not approve the drug following the death of
another study subject due to severe liver complications.94 Howev-
er, Huber was not informed of these facts, and continued taking
the study drug for two more months.99 During that time, "he expe-
rienced abdominal pains so severe that he required at least two
visits to hospital emergency rooms."9 Rather than reporting these
complaints as adverse events, Dr. Olson recorded them as "psy-
chosomatic" side effects that were 'unlikely" to be related to the
study drug. 7 Huber says eventually his distress became so pro-
nounced that he considered suicide to make the pain stop.99 Dr.
Olson wrote that Huber "decided to quit the study due to these
psychosomatic Sx [side effects].""
II. RESEARCH RECRUITMENT OF INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED
PATIENTS RAISES SERIOUS RISKS OF ABUSES
While the Markingson and Huber cases show that involuntari-
ly confined patients continue to be used as research subjects, they
give no indication of how many other such patients may be at
other facilities around the country. Indeed, even after multiple
investigations into the University of Minnesota's recruitment
90. Baillon, supra note 86.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Olson, supra note 88.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Baillon, supra note 86.
98. Olson, supra note 88.
99. Baillon, supra note 86.
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practices, it is still not known how many other involuntarily con-
fined patients university researchers have recruited into the
CAFE study or other research.
However, there is no reason to believe these cases are aberra-
tions involving rogue researchers. In each of these cases, the
treatment of these subjects found defenders. The study in the
Kaimowitz case was authorized and funded by Michigan's legisla-
ture, and researchers defended the study in the courts. Officials
at the University of Minnesota-including senior Institutional
Review Board ("IRB") officials-repeatedly insisted that Mark-
ingson's recruitment was consistent with ethical guidelines and
entirely beyond reproach.' 0 The University's IRB likewise con-
cluded Robert Huber's consent was voluntary and a consultant
hired by the University agreed.'
Although it would be preferable to have empirical data regard-
ing involuntarily committed patients' participation in research,
the incidents that have come to light highlight the power dispari-
ties between these patients and researchers and the resulting
danger of mistreatment. With respect to research recruitment,
patients under commitment orders are similarly situated to pris-
oners, who are widely recognized as being vulnerable to coercion
and exploitation. 2 Like prisoners, these patients' circumstances
100. See, e.g., Aaron Friedman, University of Minnesota Research Case Is Not a Scan-
dal, STAR TRIB. (Minn.) (May 16, 2013, 6:32 PM), http://www.startribune.com/university-of-
minnesota-research-cas e-is-not-a-scandal207795501/ (noting that Dr. Aaron Friedman,
who was then the University of Minnesota's president for health sciences and dean of the
Medical School, wrote "Mr. Markingson's suicide was a tragedy, but it is not a scandal.
Nine years later, it is time to stop blaming our university and our researchers.'); Andy
Mannix, Dan Markingson's 2004 Suicide: 'Corrective Action' Issued to Former U of M Em-
ployee, CITYPAGES (Minn.) (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.citypages.com/news/dan-marking
sons-2004-suicide-corrective-action-issued-to-former-u-of-m-employee-6558956 ('The col-
lege has repeatedly denied any wrongdoing, pointing to a number of state and federal enti-
ties that have investigated the case and cleared those who worked on the study."); LEGIS.
AUDITOR REP., supra note 33 (noting that university leaders have been "consistently un-
willing to discuss or even acknowledge that serious ethical issues and conflicts are in-
volved").
101. FTI CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF A UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD NON-COMPLIANCE DETERMINATION 16 (2015), http://www.
health.umn.edu/sites/default/files/FTI-Release.pdf. However, the key findings supporting
the consultant's conclusion are redacted from the publicly available copy of the report. Id.
In addition, the consultant never interviewed Huber, relying instead on an absence of
"documented evidence" of coercion. Id. at 16, Appendix B. It is not clear what kind of doc-
umentation would have shown coercion or why one should expect such documentation to
exist.
102. IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 21 (Trisoners are an especially vulnerable class of
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raise serious concerns about the feasibility of obtaining voluntary
informed consent to research participation. Precisely because of
their vulnerability, these patients are also at risk of being target-
ed for research recruitment because of their easy availability.
A. Involuntary Commitment Presents an Overwhelming Barrier
to Voluntary Informed Consent to Research
Ethical guidelines generally require that subjects give their in-
formed consent to participation.1 °0 Among other elements, in-
formed consent requires that subjects are competent to make de-
cisions regarding whether to participate in research and that
their consent is given voluntarily."' It is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to meet these requirements with patients under commitment
orders.
1. Impaired Decision-Making Capacity
As an initial matter, recruiting involuntarily committed pa-
tients raises obvious concerns about the decision-making capacity
of these subjects."0 By definition, mentally ill patients who have
potential research participants who historically have been exploited by physicians and re-
searchers seeking expedient solutions to complex research problems[ ]. They are the clas-
sic 'captive population."'); NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
DHEW PUB. NO. OS 76-131, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 5 (1976) [hereinafter 1976
NAT'L COMM'N REP.] ('There are two basic ethical dilemmas concerning the use of prison-
ers as research subjects: (1) whether prisoners bear a fair share of the burdens and receive
a fair share of the benefits of research; and (2) whether prisoners are, in the words of the
Nuremberg Code, 'so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice'-that is,
whether prisoners can give truly voluntary consent to participate in research."); 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.302 (2015) ("[Plrisoners may be under constraints because of their incarceration
which could affect their ability to make a truly voluntary and uncoerced decision whether
or not to participate as subjects in research.").
103. Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA
2701, 2706 (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(4) (2015).
104. NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. No. (OS)
78-0014, THE BELMONT REPORT 6-8 (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REP.], http://www.
fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/2005-4178b_09_02_Belmont%2OReport.pdf.
105. OFFICE FOR HUMAN RESEARCH PROTECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK ch. 6(D) (1993) [hereinafter IRB
GUIDEBOOK], http://wayback.archive-it.org/org-745/20150930182815/http://www.hhs.gov/
ohrp/archive/irb/irb -chapter6.htm#g5 ('The predominant ethical concern in research in-
volving individuals with psychiatric, cognitive, or developmental disorders, or who are
substance abusers is that their disorders may compromise their capacity to understand
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been involuntarily committed are ill-equipped to make judgments
regarding their own care. Under even the most permissive "need
for treatment" commitment standard, a person may not be invol-
untarily confined unless a court has determined that she suffers
from a mental illness that "[s]ubstantially impairs the person's
capacity to make an informed decision regarding treatment.'
'10 6
The most relevant studies of committed patients' competence
come from the United Kingdom. A study conducted on the inpa-
tient units of London's Maudsley Hospital found that 86 percent
of patients detained under the Mental Health Act did not have
the capacity to consent to treatment, as measured by the MacAr-
thur competence assessment tool. 1"7 This figure is consistent with
a smaller 2005 British study, which found that that 83 percent
(thirty of thirty-six patients) did not have the capacity to con-
sent.10 8 It is worth mentioning that these studies measured capac-
ity to consent to treatment, not research. However, arguably the
threshold for capacity to consent to research should be even high-
er than the standard for treatment, at least when the research
has the potential for significant risk.
Although many involuntarily committed patients may lack ad-
equate decision-making capacity to consent to research, the lack
of explicit protections for these patients gives researchers broad
latitude in assessing their capacity. For example, Dan Marking-
son was involuntarily committed because he was suffering from
profound psychosis and threatening mass murder. A week before
his commitment proceedings began, he believed that Angelina Jo-
lie was his sister and that his mother was a lizard.0 9 In the days
prior to his recruitment into the CAFE study, his treating physi-
cian, a psychologist, and a social worker each judged him to be in-
capable of making his own decisions regarding medications.11 °
the information presented and their ability to make a reasoned decision about participa-
tion.").
106. ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-501(31)(b) (2016); TAC SURVEY, supra note 10, at 7-8.
107. GARETH S. OWEN ET AL., BMJ, MENTAL CAPACITY To MAKE DECISIONS ON
TREATMENT IN PEOPLE ADMITTED TO PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS 1-3 (2008), www.bmj.coml
content/337/bmj.39580.546597.BE.full.pdf.
108. Ruth Cairns et al., Prevalence and Predictors of Mental Incapacity in Psychiatric
in-Patients, 187 BR. J. PSYCHIATRY 379, 379 (2005).
109. Rep. of Pre-Petition Screening Team, supra note 45.
110. On November 14, Dr. Olson determined that Dan was psychotic and dangerous
and that he 'lack[ed] the capacity to make decisions regarding [his] treatment." Exam'r's
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Yet these assessments did not prevent Markingson from being
asked to consent to research. In fact, Dr. Olson first discussed the
CAFE study with Markingson on November 19-the same day a
court-appointed psychologist examined Markingson and deter-
mined he had "a substantial Disorder of Thought" and a "Gross
Impairment of Judgment, Behavior, Capacity to Recognize Reali-
ty [or] to Reason or Understand.""'1 Yet when Markingson was
evaluated by CAFE study coordinator Jean Kenney on November
21, she determined that he was competent to comprehend and ra-
tionally weigh the risks and benefits of participating in a random-
ized, double-blinded drug trial." 12
There is no doubt some involuntarily committed patients are
competent to make decisions regarding research participation.
Nevertheless, the high prevalence of impaired capacity among
these patients renders the population especially vulnerable and
weighs in favor of special protections for this group.
2. Inherently Coercive Circumstances
Even among involuntarily committed patients who have ade-
quate capacity to consent to research participation, the more fun-
damental problem is that their circumstances render it impossi-
ble to ensure that their consent to participate is given
voluntarily."3 Voluntariness is a core requirement of research
ethics."' Accordingly, Subpart A of the Common Rule requires
Statement in Support of Petition for Commitment, In re Markingson, No. PX-03-10465
(Minn. Dist. Ct., 1st Jud. Dist. Nov. 17, 2003), https://www.scribd.com/doc/49742149/O1
son-Examiner-Statement-Commitment. On November 17, a court-appointed social worker
shared that assessment, concluding that Markingson did not have "the capacity to make
decisions regarding neuroleptic medications." LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 11;
Rep. of Pre-Petition Screening Team, supra note 45.
111. REP. OF EXAMINER, supra note 42, at 3; LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 11.
112. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 11.
113. See Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. (ABA)
147, 150 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty. July 10, 1973) ("Although an involuntarily detained
mental patient may have a sufficient I.Q. to intellectually comprehend his circumstances
(in Dr. Rodin's experiment, a person was required to have at least an I.Q. of 80), the very
nature of his incarceration diminishes the capacity to consent to psychosurgery. He is par-
ticularly vulnerable as a result of his mental condition, the deprivation stemming from
involuntary confinement, and the effects of the phenomenon of 'institutionalization.").
114. The Nuremberg Code (1947), 313 BMJ 1448, 1448 (1996), www.bmj.com/content/
313/7070/1448.1 ('The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This
means that the person involved ... should be so situated as to be able to exercise free
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
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that researchers seek participants' consent "only under circum-
stances that provide the prospective subject or the representative
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate
and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influ-
ence.,,115
However, in the context of prisoners it has long been recog-
nized that institutional confinement can preclude voluntary con-
sent. In its 1976 report, Research Involving Prisoners, the Na-
tional Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research found that "prisoners are, as
a consequence of being prisoners, more subject to coerced choice
and more readily available for the imposition of burdens which
others will not willingly bear.""11 Because "the Commission did not
find in prisons the conditions requisite for a sufficiently high de-
gree of voluntariness and openness," it recommended imposing
strict limits on the types of research that could be performed us-
ing prisoners and implementing a raft of procedural safeguards to
protect against coercion and exploitation.117 Recognizing that
"prisoners may be under constraints because of their incarcera-
tion which could affect their ability to make a truly voluntary and
uncoerced decision whether or not to participate as subjects in re-
search," the Department of Health and Human Services acted on
these recommendations by implementing special protections for
prisoners in certain federally funded research.'
These concerns apply with even greater force to institutional-
ized mental patients. As an initial matter, like prisoners, these
patients can be vulnerable to coercive influences by virtue of their
physical isolation from the rest of society, as well as by potential
estrangement from family members and other trusted sources of
overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion"); WMA Declaration of Hel-
sinki Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving Human Subjects, WORLD MED.
ASS'N 25 [hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki], http://www.wma.net/en/30publications
/10policies/b3/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) ("Participation by individuals capable of giving
informed consent as subjects in medical research must be voluntary .... [N]o individual
capable of giving informed consent may be enrolled in a research study unless he or she
freely agrees."); BELMONT REP. supra note 104, at 7-8 ("An agreement to participate in
research constitutes a valid consent only if voluntarily given. This element of informed
consent requires conditions free of coercion and undue influence.').
115. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2016).
116. 1976 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 8.
117. Id. at 12, 14-16, 20-21.
118. 45 C.F.R. § 46.302 (2016).
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independent advice.119 For example, when Markingson was re-
cruited into the CAFE study, he was in a locked ward at Fairview
Hospital. He did not have access to his mother or to a social
worker appointed by the court to help protect his interests.2 ' As
the Legislative Auditor determined, "given his confinement and
isolation at FUMC, Markingson had no one to provide him with
independent advice about agreeing to participate in the drug
study; all of the information and advice he was given came from
Dr. Olson [, the principal investigator,] and Jean Kenney [, the
study coordinator].",21
The potential for coercion is further heightened by the enor-
mous power disparities between institutionalized individuals and
the institution's authorities. 12  While the requirement of voluntar-
iness is rooted in respect for autonomous individuals' right to
make decisions in accordance with their own values and priori-
ties, confinement to an institution-particularly for extended pe-
riods-can profoundly erode an individual's sense of identity and
capacity for self-determination. As Erving Goffman explored in
his seminal work, Asylums, "total institutions," such as prisons
and mental hospitals, "disrupt or defile precisely those actions
that in civil society have the role of attesting to the actor and
those in his presence that he has some command over his world-
that he is a person with 'adult' self-determination, autonomy, and
freedom of action."'23 In these environments, authorities dominate
every aspect of an inmate's existence, setting daily schedules,
controlling access to both the necessities of living and other com-
forts, and exercising power to reward compliance and punish non-
119. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 136-41 (First Anchor Books ed., 1961).
120. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 15.
121. Id.
122. Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. (ABA) 147,
151 (Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty. July 10, 1973) ("Involuntarily confined mental patients
live in an inherently coercive institutional environment. Indirect and subtle psychological
coercion has profound effect upon the patient population. Involuntarily confined patients
cannot reason as equals with the doctors and administrators .... They are not able to vol-
untarily give informed consent because of the inherent inequality in their position.').
123. GOFFMAN, supra note 119, at 43; see also Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITYL. REP.
at 150 ("Institutionalization tends to strip the individual of the support which permits him
to maintain his sense of self-worth and the value of his own physical and mental integri-
ty.").
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compliance. 124 As Paul Appelbaum observed, people who live in
these circumstances become accustomed to deferring to the will of
institutional authorities-and may continue to "assume that be-
having contrary to the wishes of those in power will result in ad-
verse sanctions" even when they are told otherwise.'
In the Kaimowitz case, for example, the court highlighted Doe's
testimony that he needed authorities' approval for "such minor
things as the right to have a lamp in his room, or the right to
have ground privileges to go for a picnic with his family.' ' 26 "For
17 years he lived completely under the control of the hospital.
Nearly every important aspect of his life was decided without any
opportunity on his part to participate in the decision-making pro-
cess. ' 117 Given this backdrop of nearly total control over inmates,
the court concluded "[t]he involuntarily detained mental patient
is in an inherently coercive atmosphere even though no direct
pressures may be placed upon him."'28
Perhaps the most important power institutional authorities
hold over involuntarily confined individuals is determining when
they are ready to be released.2 9 The 1976 National Commission
report on research with prisoners identified "indeterminate re-
lease dates with nonobjective or unknown conditions for leaving
the prison" as a critical barrier to voluntary consent.' This con-
cern is even more salient in the context of civil commitment. Un-
like criminals, who are sentenced to prison for specified periods of
time (admittedly subject to some adjustments), involuntarily
committed patients are confined for indeterminate periods.'
124. See GOFFMAN, supra note 119, at 48-54; see also Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DIsABILITY
L. REP. at 147, 150-51 (discussing the highly regulated and heavily restricted environ-
ment experienced by institutionalized inmates).
125. Paul S. Appelbaum, Consent and Coercion: Research with Involuntarily Treated
Persons with Mental Illness or Substance Abuse, 4 ACCOUNTABILITY iN RES. 69, 76 (1995).
126. Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 151.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. ("It is obvious that the most important thing to a large number of involuntarily
detained mental patients incarcerated for an unknown length of time, is freedom."); 1976
NATL COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 62.
130. 1976 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 50.
131. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the Civil-
Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J.
CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 70 (1996) ("All states have statutes permitting the indefinite
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Their freedom depends on institutional authorities determining
that the patient is fit for release.
This creates strong incentives for confined patients to seek the-
se authorities' approval. The Office for Human Research Protec-
tions' Institutional Review Board Guidebook advises that "[t]he
eagerness for release may induce an institutionalized person, es-
pecially one who is involuntarily confined, to participate in re-
search out of a desire to appear 'rational' and 'cooperative' to
those who will make decisions about his or her release.' 32 The
Kaimowitz court went further, concluding "[i]t is impossible for
an involuntarily detained mental patient to be free of ulterior
forms of restraint or coercion when his very release from the in-
stitution may depend upon his cooperating with the institutional
authorities and giving consent to experimental surgery.
133
The Markingson case illustrates this potential for coercion."'
Markingson faced involuntary commitment to a long-term state
mental facility when Dr. Olson, his treating physician, first ap-
proached him about participating in the CAFE study. On Novem-
ber 20, a court issued an order that stayed Markingson's com-
mitment on the condition that he "cooperate with the treatment
plan at Fairview University Medical Center until medically dis-
charged, and follow all of the aftercare recommendations of the
treatment team[.]''3 The next day, Dr. Olson's subordinate, Jean
Kenney, sought and obtained Markingson's consent to participate
in the CAFE study. 3 '
Although ethical guidelines require that subjects understand
that they are free to terminate their participation at any time
civil commitment of persons who are mentally ill and dangerous to themselves or others.'D.
132. IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 105, at ch. 6(D); see also BELMONT REP., supra note
104, at 8 (noting that "[u]njustifiable pressures usually occur when persons in positions of
authority or commanding influence-especially where possible sanctions are involved-
urge a course of action for a subject").
133. Kaimowitz, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. at 151.
134. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 10 ("Dan Markingson was extraordinarily
vulnerable when Dr. Olson recruited him into a drug study; Markingson was mentally ill
and faced commitment to a state psychiatric hospital if he did not cooperate with the Fair-
view University Medical Center treatment plan and his treatment team's aftercare rec-
ommendations following discharge.").
135. Order for Stayed Commitment, supra note 50, at 2; LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra
note 33, at 11.
136. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 6.
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without suffering adverse consequences, 117 when Markingson was
discharged from the hospital to a halfway house he was required
to sign an agreement that required him to keep his CAFE study
appointments and continue taking his medications.138 The docu-
ment again warned Markingson that "[c]onsequences for not fol-
lowing this plan could result in court commitment to the hospi-
tal."'139 Minnesota's Legislative Auditor observed that although
Dr. Olson repeatedly claimed that "Markingson was told that he
did not have to participate in the drug study and that he had a
right to alternative treatment[," it was not clear "what Dr. Olson
or Ms. Kenney said or implied about what that alternative might
be."'40 A review of the Markingson case by the Association for the
Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs conclud-
ed, "the fear of being subjected to an involuntary legal process for
perceived noncooperation, even if there is no direct threat of such
legal compulsion, is an overwhelming barrier to voluntariness."''
Similarly, in the Kaimowitz case, the doctor who sought to per-
form psychosurgery on a mental patient testified that "involun-
tarily confined patients tend to tell their doctors what the patient
thinks these people want to hear."'4 2 The patient's testimony bore
out this contention. While he was confined, Smith steadfastly in-
sisted that his consent to experimental brain surgery was entirely
voluntary and that he would have consented to the surgery even
if he were not confined in an institution."' Yet once he was re-
leased from confinement, he withdrew his consent."' The testi-
mony at trial indicated that Smith had in fact consented to this
surgery "partly because of his effort to show the doctors in the
hospital that he was a cooperative patient."'45 Smith was willing
to accept the extremely serious risks of experimental brain sur-
137. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2016).
138. Aftercare Agreement, supra note 67.
139. Id.
140. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 15.
141. AAHRPP REP., supra note 33, at 67; see also TAC SURVEY, supra note 10, at 11
(noting that outpatient commitment "motivates patients by impressing upon them,
through the symbolic power of the judge as an authority figure, the seriousness of their
need to comply with treatment. (This is sometimes called 'the black robe effect.)").
142. Kaimowitz v. Dep't of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 141, 150
(Mich. Cir. Ct., Wayne Cty. July 10, 1973).
143. Id. at 147.
144. Id. at 154 n.23.
145. Id. at 151.
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gery-which included the possibility of brain damage or death-
because he believed it would help him gain his liberty.
The Common Rule seeks to protect voluntariness by requiring
that subjects be informed "that participation is voluntary, refusal
to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which
the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discontinue
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to
which the subject is otherwise entitled."1 '6 For prisoners, the rules
further require that "each prisoner is clearly informed in advance
that participation in the research will have no effect on his or her
parole. 147
But the inherent coerciveness of the institutional environment
cannot be remedied simply by explaining to patients that they are
free to refuse participation without suffering adverse consequenc-
es-even when patients have sufficient decision-making capacity
to comprehend this information. First, stating this in a consent
form does not make it true. While institutional authorities may
have no intention of punishing patients for declining to partici-
pate, they may nevertheless draw adverse inferences from a pa-
tient's refusal. If authorities believe participation is in the pa-
tient's interest, they may take the patient's refusal as an
indication that the patient is not capable of making decisions re-
garding his or her own care, and may take that into account-
consciously or subconsciously-when making assessments about
the patient's progress and suitability for release.
Second, even when authorities would draw no adverse infer-
ences from a patient's refusal to participate in research, merely
informing a patient of this may do little to counteract the effects
of a patient's routine, forced acquiescence to authorities' impera-
tives.148 As Thomas Grisso asks,
When a member has adapted to a system of few choices, substantial
dependence on official-controlled rewards, and functional regimenta-
tion, what does it mean to him or her when an official (or a profes-
146. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2016).
147. Id. § 46.305(a)(6).
148. Thomas Grisso, Voluntary Consent to Research Participation in the Institutional
Context, in RESEARCH ETHICS: A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 203, 212 (Barbara H. Stanley
et al. eds., 1996) ("[R]esidents' expectancies based on their socialization to the power and
control of institutional officials are not always easily undermined by providing contradic-
tory information.").
[Vol. 51:10411064
PATIENTS AS PRISONERS
sional from outside the system) walks up and says: 'Here's some-
thing I'd like you to do-but it's up to you; do you want to do it or
not?' What would it take to convince the institutionally socialized
member to shed member identity and to resume personal identity as
an autonomous individual for this one specific purpose?
149
This concern is amplified when the researcher seeking the pa-
tient's consent is also the treating physician." ° The Declaration of
Helsinki advises that "[w]hen seeking informed consent for par-
ticipation in a research study the physician must be particularly
cautious if the potential subject is in a dependent relationship
with the physician or may consent under duress.""' In those situ-
ations, the Declaration advises that "informed consent must be
sought by an appropriately qualified individual who is completely
independent of this relationship.""' 2
However, even when researchers are independent from institu-
tional authorities, involuntarily committed patients may not ap-
preciate that distinction."' And they may be so inured to defer-
ring to authorities that the distinction may have little impact on
their beliefs regarding their freedom to choose or their ability to
exercise agency. For example, in a study of fifteen and sixteen-
year-olds confined to a juvenile detention center, Grisso engaged
in an extensive pre-experimental consent session with 192 sub-
jects. Subjects were informed at least twice that they were free to
refuse participation without suffering adverse consequences, that
they could discontinue their participation at any time, and that
the researcher was independent from the court and police and
would not share with these authorities any information obtained
in the research."' Quizzed afterwards, however, 46 percent of the
subjects did not recall that the researcher was independent and
149. Id. at 206.
150. See id. at 205 (stating that institutionalized patients' "power deficiency" vis a vis
researchers "may be especially salient when institutional residents' research participation
is sought by an investigator with institutionally sanctioned authority.").
151. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 114, 27.
152. Id.
153. Grisso, supra note 148, at 209 ("[T]he potential volunteer brings to the situation
certain expectancies about members' interactions with institutional officials. These expec-
tancies may generalize to other persons (such as the researcher) whose status may be per-
ceived to be more nearly that of an institutional official than that of an institutional mem-
ber.").
154. Id. at 211.
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61 percent expressed doubts about the truthfulness of that
claim.'55 Given their profound mental illnesses, involuntarily
committed patients may be even less capable of distinguishing
between researchers and institutional authorities.
B. Recruiting Involuntarily Confined Psychiatric Patients Targets
a Vulnerable Population
As the history of human subjects research has shown, many
subjects are vulnerable to exploitation or mistreatment by virtue
of their condition or situation. For this reason, the Common Rule
extends special protections to certain "vulnerable populations."'5 6
The relevant passage of the Common Rule does not provide an
exhaustive list of vulnerable populations, but as examples it
names "children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally disabled
persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged per-
sons."1 7 If, as many have argued, vulnerability is characterized by
a diminished capacity to protect one's own interests,"8 then invol-
untarily confined, mentally ill patients are clearly as vulnerable
as many of the listed populations.
Justice requires that vulnerable populations should not be tar-
geted for participation in research because of their easy availabil-
ity or manipulability."9 Moreover, vulnerable populations should
not bear the burdens of research that they are unlikely to benefit
from, either individually or as a group.'6 ' Accordingly, Subpart A
of the Common Rule provides that IRBs may only approve a re-
155. Id. at 211-12.
156. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2016).
157. Id.
158. COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS. (CIOMS), INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 64 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter CIOMS GUIDELINES]; Doris Schroeder & Eugenijus Gefenas, Vulnerability: Too Vague
and Too Broad?, 18 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 113, 113-14 (2009).
159. Emanuel et al., supra note 103, at 2704 ("[F]air subject selection requires that the
scientific goals of the study, not vulnerability, privilege, or other factors unrelated to the
purposes of the research, be the primary basis for determining the groups and individuals
that will be recruited and enrolled.").
160. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 114, 20 ("Medical research involving a disad-
vantaged or vulnerable population or community is only justified if the research is respon-
sive to the health needs and priorities of this population or community and if there is a
reasonable likelihood that this population or community stands to benefit from the results
of the research.").
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search protocol after finding that selection of subjects is equita-
ble.1
6 1
However, market pressures can work against this goal by cre-
ating incentives to quickly recruit subjects for participation in re-
search that may be unattractive to more advantaged populations.
Within the pharmaceutical industry in particular, subject re-
cruitment is one of the biggest impediments to the success of clin-
ical trials."2 Several studies have found that most randomized
controlled trials fail to achieve their recruitment targets, while
others must be delayed in order to recruit sufficient subjects. 6' As
a result, pharmaceutical researchers are under immense pressure
to quickly enroll willing subjects. A report on research recruit-
ment by HHS's Office of the Inspector General reported that
when asked what sponsors are looking for from research sites,
one investigator replied, "Number one-rapid enrollment. Num-
ber two-rapid enrollment. Number three-rapid enrollment."'"
This pressure has sometimes led researchers to target institu-
tionalized persons for research participation. As the Belmont Re-
port warned:
161. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2016).
162. See, e.g., Kathleen B. Drennan, Patient Recruitment: The Costly and Growing Bot-
tleneck in Drug Development, 7 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 3 (2002) ("Within the clinical tri-
als industry, it is a well-known fact that at least 80% of trials fail to meet their enrollment
deadlines."); Taren Grom, Unclogging the Patient Recruitment Bottleneck, PHARMAVOICE
(Feb. 2011), http://www.pharmavoice.com/article/2182/ ("Patient recruitment remains to be
one of the biggest, and most costly, bottlenecks in clinical development.... [I]ndustry av-
erages reveal that more than 80% of clinical trials are delayed because of poor enroll-
ment.").
163. Alison M. McDonald et al., What Influences Recruitment to Randomised Controlled
Trials? A Review of Trials Funded By Two UK Funding Agencies, 7 TRIALS 9, 9 (2006)
(study of 114 multisite trials found that fewer than one-third of these studies achieved
their original target for subject recruitment); Shaun Treweek et al., Methods To Improve
Recruitment to Randomised Controlled Trials: Cochrane Systematic Review and Meta-
Analysis, 3 BMJ OPEN 24, 25 (2013) (in a study of trials in the U.S. National Institute of
Health inventory, 66 percent failed to meet recruitment targets, and 24 percent failed to
meet even half of the recruitment targets); Judith M. Watson & David J. Torgerson, In-
creasing Recruitment To Randomised Trials: A Review Of Randomised Controlled Trials, 6
BMC MED. RES. METHODOLOGY 34, 34 (2006) ("Recruitment to randomised trials can be
very poor. A recent survey of corresponding authors of randomised trials published be-
tween the years 2000 and 2001 in the Lancet or BMJ found that nearly 60% had either
failed to meet their recruitment target or required an extended recruitment period.").
164. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OEI-01-97-00195, RECRUITING HUMAN SUBJECTS: PRESSURES IN INDUSTRY-SPONSORED
CLINICAL RESEARCH 13 (2000).
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[T]he institutionalized may continually be sought as research sub-
jects, owing to their ready availability in settings where research is
conducted. Given their dependent status and their frequently com-
promised capacity for free consent, they should be protected against
the danger of being involved in research solely for administrative
convenience, or because they are easy to manipulate as a result of
their illness or socioeconomic condition."'
For example, in the 1960s, new regulations requiring safety test-
ing of pharmaceuticals as a condition of FDA approval drove drug
companies to seek out prisoners as test subjects.166 The National
Commission's 1976 report concluded that this practice was often
exploitative.167 Noting a "paucity of evidence of any necessity to
conduct research in prisons, 168 the Commission recommended
that research on prisoners be strictly curtailed in order "to ensure
that this burden not be unduly visited upon prisoners simply be-
cause of their captive status and administrative availability." '169
Consistent with that recommendation, Subpart C of the Common
Rule bars research on prisoners, with limited exceptions.17 °
Although these provisions all but ended recruitment of prison-
ers in federally funded research, they impose no restrictions on
the use of involuntarily committed patients, who may be attrac-
tive subjects in current market conditions. Medications to treat
psychiatric illnesses are among the most highly prescribed drugs
in the world, generating tens of billions in revenues annually. 171
These medications must be tested on mentally ill subjects, both as
part of the FDA approval process and (as in the CAFE study) in
postmarketing studies.
172
The Markingson case illustrates the potential for involuntarily
confined mental patients to be targeted for inclusion in research
because of their easy availability and manipulability. As a princi-
pal investigator for the CAFE study, Dr. Olson was under signifi-
165. BELMONT REP., supra note 104, at 10.
166. 1976 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 24; Reiter, supra note 1, at 515.
167. 1976 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 7.
168. Id. at 12.
169. Id. at 7.
170. 45 C.F.R. § 306(b) (2016).
171. Michael Bartholow, Top 200 Drugs of 2012, PHARMACY TIMES (July 17, 2013),
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2013/July2l3/Top-20O-Drugs-of-2012
(reporting $23.5 billion in U.S. health care expenditures on mental health drugs in 2012).
172. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2012 & Supp. II 2015); see also Elliott, supra note 34.
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cant pressure to recruit subjects. His agreement with AstraZene-
ca called for him to enroll thirty participants at the University of
Minnesota trial site, with the university earning $15,648 for each
subject who completed the study.173 But at the outset he and his
team struggled badly to meet that target, recruiting only one sub-
ject in the first six months of the study.174 This performance was
so poor that Quintiles, the contract research organization manag-
ing the trial, placed the University of Minnesota trial site on
"probation" for its lackluster recruitment."5 Study coordinator
Jean Kenney expressed particular frustration about parents in-
tervening to dissuade their children from enrolling in the CAFE
study.'76 In a January 2003 email to Quintiles, Kenney wrote:
Have had another person show interest from inpatient and then the
parent put the pressure on and said, "NO." (3rd time this has hap-
pened) Have tried to ask about concerns, etc. but usually just get a
NO. So, some frustration here b/c we really need to get more enrol-
lees. We've had none for January and that concerns me a lot.1
77
To bolster its recruitment efforts, in April 2003, the Universi-
ty's psychiatry department set up an inpatient unit at Fairview
Hospital where they could get better access to patients.'78 Under
this new arrangement, every patient who reported to Fairview
with symptoms of psychosis would be evaluated as a potential re-
search subject for the CAFE study. 9 After recruiting only one
subject in the first six months of the trial, under this arrange-
ment, Dr. Olson recruited twelve more subjects in the next eight
months, including Markingson."
Under these conditions, Markingson may have been an attrac-
tive target for recruitment precisely because he was involuntarily
173. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 15.
174. Jeremy Olson & Paul Tosto, The Death of Subject 13, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS,
May 18, 2008, at Al.
175. Deposition of Charles Schulz at 200, Weiss v. Bd. of Regents for the Univ. of
Minn., No. 27-CV-07-1679, 2008 WL 4103146 (Minn. Dist. Ct., 4th Jud. Dist. June 22,
2007), https://www.scribd.comldocument/50047611/Schulz-Deposition.
176. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 15-16.
177. Id. at 16.
178. Olson & Tosto, supra note 174.
179. Id.
180. Alexandros Stamatoglou, The Physician Payment Sunshine Act: An Important
First Step in Mitigating Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medical and Clinical Practice, 45
MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 964 n.10 (2012).
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confined, isolated from his mother, and facing long-term commit-
ment to a mental institution if Dr. Olson deemed him unfit for re-
lease. As the Legislative Auditor concluded:
Even though payments from AstraZeneca did not go directly to Dr.
Olson or Jean Kenney, University officials told us-and have said
publicly many times-that the University's budget depends on facul-
ty bringing in outside revenue from research grants. Nevertheless,
we cannot be certain what role obtaining outside revenue played in
Dan Markingson's recruitment and retention in the CAFt study.
But we do know that AstraZeneca set a goal for Dr. Olson and pro-
rated its payments to the University in a way that clearly created an
incentive to enroll and keep subjects enrolled in the CAFt study.
We also know that Dr. Olson kept Markingson in the study despite
Mary Weiss' repeated warnings that Dan was not well and the study
medication was not working.
As a captive population whose autonomy is strictly circum-
scribed, involuntarily committed patients may be tempting tar-
gets for "types of research which persons better situated would
ordinarily refuse."'' 2 Yet the Common Rule does not list mental
illness as a specific example of vulnerability apart from the gen-
eral category of "mentally disabled persons," nor does it provide
any concrete guidance for dealing with the problems characteris-
tic of studies with mentally ill research subjects. As Bonnie
writes: "The regulations are altogether silent on impairment of
decision-making capacity, the consequences of decisional impair-
ment, the designation and duties of proxy decision makers, and
the nature of safeguards that IRBs are expected to consider.' 83
In fact, the additional layer of protections that the Common
Rule supposedly afforded to vulnerable populations is very thin
indeed. The Common Rule simply instructs IRBs to make sure
that "additional safeguards have been included in the study to
protect the rights and welfare of these subjects."'" In addition, if
an IRB regularly reviews protocols involving vulnerable popula-
tions, the Common Rule advises it to include "one or more indi-
181. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 16-17.
182. 1976 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 8.
183. Richard J. Bonnie, Research with Cognitively Impaired Subjects, 54 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHOL. 105, 109 (1997).
184. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2016).
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viduals who are knowledgeable about and experienced in working
with these subjects."'85
The inadequacy of the Common Rule to sufficiently address the
problems of research with mentally ill subjects was noted by the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission in its 1998 report, Re-
search Involving Persons with Mental Disorders That May Affect
Decisionmaking Capacity.'86 The Commission observed that "per-
sons with mental disorders who may have impaired capacity[ ] to
make decisions, and therefore to give voluntary informed consent,
have not received any such special protections," and that federal
research guidelines "provide no specific guidance for IRBs and in-
vestigators."'87 It concluded, "[t]he National Bioethics Advisory
Commission [ ] believes this state of affairs is not satisfactory."'8 8
Other official bodies have attempted to fill this gap. For exam-
ple, the International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects produced by the Council for Interna-
tional Organizations of Medical Sciences ("CIOMS") count as vul-
nerable all individuals "who by reason of mental or behavioural
disorders are not capable of giving adequately informed con-
sent."'89 Among the special protections the CIOMS guidelines rec-
ommend are consent from a responsible family member or legally
authorized representative, consent of the subject insofar as it is
possible, and assurance that the research is to obtain knowledge
relevant to the health needs of persons with mental or behavioral
disorders.'8 Most importantly, investigators must ensure that re-
search is not done on such persons if the research "might equally
well be carried out on persons whose capacity to give adequately
informed consent is not impaired."''
This last requirement is critical, as the notorious Willowbrook
hepatitis study made clear. From 1958 to 1964, at the Willow-
brook State School on Staten Island, New York University pedia-
trician Saul Krugman deliberately infected mentally disabled, in-
185. Id. § 46.107.
186. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, RESEARCH INVOLVING PERSONS WITH
MENTAL DISORDERS THAT MAY AFFECT DECISIONMAKING CAPACITY 1-2 (1998).
187. Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
188. Id.
189. CIOMS GUIDELINES, supra note 158, at 70.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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stitutionalized children with hepatitis A in order to study the
course of the disease.92 After Henry Beecher's famous article in
the New England Journal of Medicine made the Willowbrook
study an issue of public controversy,'93 Krugman defended it in
part by arguing that hepatitis A was already endemic at Willow-
brook, a notoriously filthy, overcrowded, poorly funded institu-
tion."'94 He also pointed out that he had asked the children's par-
ents for proxy consent."9' But as Paul Ramsey argued in response,
there was nothing about Krugman's study that required it to be
done on children, much less disabled, institutionalized children.9
The study could just as well have been done on competent adults
who were capable of giving voluntary consent.
A 1978 national commission made the same point about insti-
tutionalized populations in general. In a report entitled Research
Involving Those Institutionalized as Mentally Infirm, the commis-
sion wrote:
If there are two classes of subjects, one of which is already severely
burdened and the other of which is much less burdened, then in or-
der to equalize the distribution of burdens, the latter class ought to
accept any additional risks. Because those institutionalized as men-
tally infirm are already burdened by their disabilities, other less
burdened classes of persons should accept the risks of research.
97
The same point applies to involuntarily confined mental pa-
tients. Very few psychiatric research studies must be conducted
on involuntarily confined patients rather than outpatients or in-
patients who have been admitted on a voluntary basis. While ar-
guably some studies may be very difficult to conduct on popula-
tions other than involuntary patients (studies of physical
restraints, for instance), these rare exceptions should not be per-
mitted to guide policy. In general, given a choice, researchers
should be required to conduct studies on the least vulnerable
population.
192. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J.
517, 531 (2007).
193. See generally Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1354 (1966) (discussing the ethics of the Willowbrook study).
194. Saul Krugman, Letter to the Editor, Experiments at the Willowbrook State School,
THE LANCET, May 8, 1971, at 966.
195. Id.
196. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 48-49
(2d ed. 1970).
197. 1978 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 20, at 60.
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III. EXISTING RESEARCH PROTECTIONS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO
PROTECT INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED PATIENTS
As described above, involuntarily committed patients are not
suitable candidates for most research under the general provi-
sions of the Common Rule. Nevertheless, existing research guide-
lines are inadequate to protect these patients from coercion and
exploitation. Federal rules apply only to a limited range of re-
search, while state law protections vary widely. Current rules al-
so offer insufficient guidance regarding ethical recruitment of
these patients and lack meaningful oversight and enforcement
mechanisms.
A. Existing Rules Have Enormous Gaps in Coverage
There is no uniform set of guidelines that apply to all human
subjects research in the United States. The vast majority of hu-
man subjects research is not covered by the Common Rule, which
generally applies only to research conducted or supported by a
federal agency that has adopted the rule.9 Organizations con-
ducting federally funded research must submit a Federalwide As-
surance to the Office of Human Research Protections, which gives
them the option of extending the Common Rule to all of their
human subjects research, including studies without federal fund-
ing.9 However, a diminishing number of institutions are choos-
ing to do so. According to the Association for the Accreditation of
Human Research Protection Programs, only 32 percent of aca-
demic institutions with accredited human research protections
198. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2016) ("Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
this policy applies to all research involving human subjects conducted, supported or oth-
erwise subject to regulation by any federal department or agency which takes appropriate
administrative action to make the policy applicable to such research."). Proposed changes
call for expanding the rule's coverage to encompass "all studies, regardless of funding
source, that are conducted by a U.S. institution that receives some federal funding for hu-
man subjects research from a Common Rule agency." Regulatory Changes in ANPRM:
Comparison of Existing Rules with Some of the Changes Being Considered, DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND Hum. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/re
gulatory-changes-in-anprmlindex.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) . Even with this change,
however, the rules would not apply to institutions that do not receive federal funding, in-
cluding privately funded research. See id.
199. Federalwide Assurance Instructions, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/register-irbs-and-obtain-fwas/forms/fwa-instructions/index.html
(last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
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programs chose to apply the Common Rule to non-federally fund-
ed studies in 2014.2°°
Had the Common Rule been in effect at the time of the Kai-
mowitz case, the proposed psychosurgery research would not have
been subject to its provisions because it was funded by the State
of Michigan. Similarly, the CAFE trial in which Markingson was
enrolled was not governed by federal regulations because the
study was funded by a pharmaceutical company. 2°' Although the
FDA has adopted regulations similar to the provisions of Subpart
A of the Common Rule, these rules only apply to clinical investi-
gations regulated by the FDA and research supporting applica-
tions for FDA approval of drugs and devices. 22 Because the CAFE
trial was a post-marketing study of FDA-approved drugs, these
regulations also did not apply to the trial.
State laws governing research vary dramatically in the protec-
tions they afford involuntarily committed patients. Missouri law
bars all biomedical and pharmacological research in mental
health facilities housing civilly detained patients "unless such re-
search is intended to alleviate or prevent the disabling conditions
or is reasonably expected to be of direct therapeutic benefit to the
participants. 2 3 The statute further provides that no involuntary
patient may consent to participate in any such research without a
court order.0 4 In response to the Markingson case, Minnesota's
legislature passed "Dan's Law," which prohibits recruitment of
patients under a stay of commitment order, with limited excep-
tions.0 Other jurisdictions require that research involving invol-
untarily committed patients must satisfy the requirements of the
200. Theresa Defino, AAHRPP Metrics Report Shows Slightly Fewer 'Unchecked Boxes',
12 REP. ON REs. COMPLIANCE 6-7 (2015).
201. Although the FDA has adopted regulations similar to the provisions of Subpart A,
these rules apply only to "clinical investigations regulated by the [FDA] ... as well as clin-
ical investigations that support applications for research or marketing permits for prod-
ucts regulated by the [FDA]," including drugs and medical devices. 21 C.F.R. § 50.1(a)
(2016). Because the CAFE trial was a post-marketing study of FDA-approved drugs, these
regulations did not apply to the trial. It is possible the University of Minnesota voluntarily
committed to apply the Common Rule to all of its research during this period, but we have
been unable to confirm this.
202. Id.
203. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.192 (2016).
204. Id.
205. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.095 (2016).
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Common Rule. 216 Still, others merely provide that no such re-
search should be conducted without patients' informed consent.2 7
The potential for state laws to leave involuntarily confined pa-
tients at risk of mistreatment is illustrated by regulations prom-
ulgated by the State of New York's Office of Mental Health
("OMH") in the 1990s, ostensibly "to ensure the protection of pa-
tients who participate in research while, at the same time, facili-
tating research into the very disorders from which they suffer and
which underlie their impairment.""2 However, in response to a le-
gal challenge filed by a disabilities rights group, a court found the
regulations grossly inadequate to protect patients in the state's
care.
Among other defects,2"9 OMH's standards for enrolling incom-
petent, involuntarily committed patients in clinical trials were
lower than the standards the United States Supreme Court has
determined are required for involuntarily medicating convicted
criminals. Due process allows prison officials to give inmates psy-
chotropic medications against their will only "if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the in-
mate's medical interest."10 Prisoners "must receive notice of the
tentative diagnosis, the factual basis for the diagnosis, and why
the staff believes medication is necessary," and they have a right
to hearings within the institution as well as review by a court.211
By contrast, the OMH regulations permitted researchers to
subject involuntarily committed patients to interventions that not
only were medically unnecessary, but that offered them either no
benefit or minimal benefits.2 2 Moreover, the OMH rules did not
require that patients or their representatives even be notified
206. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-20-147, 53-21-147 (2017); see TENN. CODE ANN. §
41-21-601 (2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.61() (2016).
207. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 9, § 778 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 433.484 (2016); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 27A-12-3.12 (2016).
208. T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 175 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1996).
209. The rules did not specify the minimum qualifications of individuals who were re-
sponsible for assessing subjects' decision-making capacity. Id. at 189. Moreover, although
OMH argued it voluntarily complied with federal regulations, the court determined the
office had actually "exempted themselves from important reporting requirements and in-
stead [had] elected to report to themselves." Id. at 184.
210. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990).
211. Id. at 216.
212. T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
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that they had been found incompetent, or that a surrogate had
determined they should participate in research.213 Accordingly,
patients had no way to challenge or seek review of those determi-
nations. Indeed, "given the lack of a notice requirement, the pa-
tient... may not even be aware he or she is involved in re-
search." '214 If incompetent patients declined to participate in
research, that refusal could be overridden without notice to the
patient or her representative, forcibly subjecting these patients to
"invasive and painful procedures and/or the administration of
psychotropic drugs" to advance research that offered them no
benefit.215 In sum, under the OMH regulations convicted crimi-
nals had greater rights to refuse treatment than involuntarily
committed patients had rights to refuse participation in non-
therapeutic research.
The lack of uniform federal standards applicable to all human
subjects research leaves involuntarily committed patients subject
to varying levels of protection. In many cases, those protections
are grossly deficient.
B. IRB Oversight Is Insufficient to Protect Involuntarily
Committed Patients
Even if the Common Rule applied to all research involving in-
voluntarily committed patients, the oversight required by Sub-
part A is not robust enough to prevent abuses, particularly in the
context of research using involuntarily confined subjects.216 The
lynchpin of the system for protecting research subjects is review
by Institutional Review Boards, or IRBs.2"7 The federal rules place
these panels of volunteers in the role of gatekeepers, requiring
researchers to obtain an IRB's approval before recruiting sub-
jects. These boards prospectively evaluate researchers' study pro-
213. Id. at 189, 193.
214. Id. at 190.
215. Id. at 185.
216. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 12 ("Approval of research by the IRB is a critical
step, but it is not sufficient. Research involving prisoners must be monitored throughout
the course of the study to verify that procedures are being conducted as approved and to
detect adverse events or unanticipated problems in a timely manner.").
217. See IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 105, at ch. 1(A) (explaining that IRBs are "estab-
lished to protect the rights and welfare of human research subjects recruited to participate
in research activities").
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tocols, which describe how they propose to run the study and the
protections they will provide to subjects.21 s IRBs can reject studies
or require changes to protocols to ensure that research conforms
to federal rules.2 19
Critics have raised serious concerns about the ability of IRBs to
protect subjects in the multi-billion dollar clinical trials indus-
try.22 ° First, although the Common Rule has some requirements
regarding the constitution of IRB membership,22' "[a]nyone who
can bring together five people, including a community representa-
tive, a physician, a lawyer and an 'ethicist,' can set up shop and
start competing for business." '222 Although HHS has a process for
registering IRBs, registration generally is not required.223 Even
when IRBs register, it is not clear that HHS monitors these regis-
trations to ensure the legitimacy and quality of IRBs. As part of a
2009 investigation, the Government Accountability Office regis-
tered a fake IRB whose CEO was listed as Truper Dawg, named
after a staff member's three-legged dog. 24 Other names in the reg-
istration application included "April Phuls" and "Timothy Wit-
tless. '225 Nevertheless, HHS registered the IRB. The Government
Accountability Office ("GAO") then created a website for the fake
IRB and quickly began receiving study protocols for ethical re-
view-including one from a research company that wanted to do
human trials involving invasive surgery.22 6
218. 45 C.F.R. § 46.109 (2016).
219. Id.
220. See Osagie K Obasogie, Prisoners as Human Subjects: A Closer Look at the Insti-
tute of Medicine's Recommendations to Loosen Current Restrictions on Using Prisoners in
Scientific Research, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 41, 75-77 (2010); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al.,
Should Society Allow Research Ethics Boards to Be Run As For-Profit Enterprises?, 3 PLOS
MED. 0941, 0942-0944 (2006); David Evans et al., Big Pharma's Shameful Secret,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS, Dec. 2005, at 39.
221. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107 (2016).
222. Emanuel et al., supra note 220, at 0942.
223. 45 C.F.R. § 46.501 requires IRBs to register with HHS only "if they will review
human subjects research conducted or supported by HHS and are to be designated under
an assurance of compliance approved for federalwide use (i.e., an FWA) by OHRP." IRB
Registration Process FAQs, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
regulations-and-policy/guidance/faq/irb-registration-process/index.html (last visited Apr.
5, 2017).
224. Alicia Mundy, Sting Operation Exposes Gaps in Oversight of Human Experiments,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2009, 8:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1238111795723531
81.
225. Id.
226. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-448T, HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH:
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Nothing in the federal rules prevents research organizations
"from selecting the IRB least likely to reject the trial or delay ap-
proval by imposing too many restrictions. If one IRB is too strin-
gent, they can simply go to the one next door." '227 Accordingly pri-
vate, for-profit IRBs have sprung up to compete for business from
entities conducting research-a practice so common that a major-
ity of research supporting new drug submissions to the FDA is
now approved by for-profit IRBs.228 This arrangement presents a
fundamental conflict of interest, as IRBs are paid by the same en-
tities they are entrusted with policing.229 This system incentivizes
quick approvals, rather than thorough, exacting analysis.
GAO investigators demonstrated the seriousness of this prob-
lem by setting up a fake medical device company and submitting
a research proposal to various for-profit IRBs.230 The protocol
called for researchers to pour a liter of a liquid-previously re-
jected by the FDA as unsafe-into women's abdominal cavities af-
ter surgery."' Two IRBs rejected the proposal, with a member of
one describing the study as "a terrible risk for the patient ... It is
the worst thing I have ever seen." '232 Yet the study was approved
by another review board called Coast IRB, which encouraged re-
search entities to "[r]elax and Coast through your next IRB expe-
rience with us!"'233 The GAO determined that in the previous five
years, Coast had reviewed 356 protocols for research on human
subjects and had approved all of them.234 The company had
earned $9.3 million in revenue in the previous four years."'
UNDERCOVER TESTS SHOW THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD SYSTEM IS VULNERABLE TO
UNETHICAL MANIPULATION (2009).
227. Emanuel et al., supra note 220, at 0942.
228. Carl Elliott & Trudo Lemmens, Ethics for Sale, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2005, 1:01 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health-and-science/medical-examiner/2005/12/ethics-for
sale.html.
229. Emanuel et al., supra note 220, at 0942.
230. Mundy, supra note 224.
231. Heidi Ledford, U.S. Government Investigates Human Research Protections,
NATURE (Mar. 27, 2009, 2:40 PM), http:/fblogs.nature.com/news/2009/03/usgovernment_
investigateshum.html.
232. Mundy, supra note 224.
233. See What Is Your Experience with Your IRB?, COAST IRB (July 11, 2008), http:/!
coastirb.blogspot.com/2008/07/coast-irb-what-is-your-experience-with.html.
234. Editorial, How Ethical Are For-Profit Institutional Review Boards?, 373 LANCET
1400, 1400 (2009).
235. Id.
[Vol. 51:10411078
PATIENTS AS PRISONERS
University IRBs face serious conflicts of interest of their own.
As Ezekiel Emanuel has observed:
Both commercial and academic IRBs have a financial conflict of in-
terest, especially since increasingly academic IRBs are charging
competitive prices for their services, making them indistinguishable
from commercial IRBs. Academic IRBs have the additional conflict
that the researchers being reviewed are colleagues of the IRB mem-
bers. And they have yet a further conflict since the institution wants
and needs the commercial research in order to gain access to new
drugs and devices to enhance its reputation as innovative. 36
These conflicts were on display in the Markingson case, in which
the IRB panel overseeing the CAFE study was chaired by a doctor
with substantial personal, professional, and financial conflicts of
interest."7 The IRB panel was chaired by Dr. David Adson, a fac-
ulty member in the Department of Psychiatry.238 In that role, Dr.
Adson was responsible for reviewing a study whose principal in-
vestigators were two of his colleagues, one of whom was the chair
of his department.239 He was also the director of the research cen-
ter in which the CAFE study was housed. 4 ' Dr. Adson had also
received some $650,000 in payments from drug companies over
an eight-year period, with around $150,000 coming from Astra-
Zeneca, the sponsor of the CAFE trial.41
Even when IRBs rigorously review research protocols, their
work is almost entirely prospective-they exercise very little
oversight of research on an ongoing basis.4 Rather than directly
observing the conduct of research or interacting with subjects,
IRBs trust researchers to follow the protocols they submitted and
to report any problems they encounter. For example, the chair of
the University of Minnesota's IRB told the Legislative Auditor
236. Emanuel et al., supra note 220, at 0943.
237. See LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 21.
238. Carl Elliott, Getting By with a Little Help from Your Friends, THE HASTINGS CTR.
(Oct. 18, 2013, 10:48 AM), http://www.thehastingscenter.org/getting-by-with-a-little-help-
from-your-friends/.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. In the T.D. case, the appellate court rejected OMH's argument that the deficien-
cies in its own regulations were not of concern because subjects would still be protected by
IRBs. The appellate court rejected that argument, noting that "in practice, the IRBs do not
conduct in-depth evaluations" and "do not review the work of the researchers on a day-to-
day or even monthly basis." T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173,
189 n.9, 190 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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that "the IRB pays close attention to research policies, proce-
dures, and guidance but cannot ensure that a researcher is fol-
lowing the strict letter of the law or ethical principles .243 Instead,
she indicated that the IRB trusts researchers to follow the rules,
rejecting even the notion of "trust but verify" as impractical and
inconsistent with common practice.2 4
This is something of a paradox, since the very purpose of IRBs
is to protect subjects from unethical conduct by researchers.2 45 But
many IRBs do not exercise any meaningful oversight to ensure
that researchers are actually following their protocols. Again, the
Markingson case illustrates this problem. Dr. Olson told the IRB
that "[s]ubjects will have an advocate. This person will typically
be a case manager, nurse, family member or friend. ,,2"" The
Legislative Auditor noted that "[i]n Markingson's case, an advo-
cate could have considered his special circumstances-including
the potential coerciveness of being under a stay of commitment-
and discussed those issues with Markingson before he signed the
consent form." '247 However, Markingson was not provided with an
advocate at any time prior to his enrollment in the CAFE study.
2 48
The inadequacy of IRBs to protect research subjects is exacer-
bated when subjects are involuntarily confined. It is especially
difficult to exercise effective oversight of research that is under-
taken on populations who are isolated from society, under con-
stant surveillance by authorities, and subject to potential retalia-
tion for reporting problems.249 Involuntarily committed mental
patients are not well-positioned to recognize or report mistreat-
ment, particularly while they are confined. In the Kaimowitz
case, for example, it was not Louis Smith who challenged re-
243. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 22.
244. Id. The previous director of the University of Minnesota's IRB likewise testified in
a deposition that the purpose of an IRB is not to protect research subjects, but simply to
ensure that researchers have an adequate plan in place to protect subjects. Elliott, supra
note 34.
245. Elliott, supra note 34 (quoting Dr. Olson's application to the IRB).
246. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 19.
247. Id. (emphasis in original).
248. Id.
249. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 120-21 (quoting Allen Hornblum, "It is so much
easier for indiscretions or bad intentions to take place behind those prison walls and razor
wire. I have seen it in so many cases, where doctors who were sworn to save lives and do
good have become so consumed by that intellectual scientific quest that they forget about
the test subject. It is just so easy to abuse the situation.").
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searchers' proposal to subject him to experimental psychosur-
gery."' Rather, a lawyer learned of the impending experiment
and filed suit to stop it.25' In Robert Huber's case, no one inter-
vened.252 He complained repeatedly about severe abdominal pain,
but Dr. Olson dismissed his complaints as "psychosomatic," and
not related to the study drug-which had already been denied
FDA approval after another patient died of severe liver complica-
tions."' Huber withdrew from the study only after he had been re-
leased from confinement and had contemplated suicide to end his
254pain.
Even when subjects have someone who is interested in their
care and willing to advocate for them, there is no guarantee they
will be able to effectively address problems with their treatment.
Markingson's mother, Mary Weiss, repeatedly reached out to
members of his treatment team, expressing grave concerns about
his care and his deteriorating condition.255 Yet the Legislative Au-
ditor found "little evidence that the study team adequately fol-
lowed up with her about her concerns.""2 6 The study team did not
even record Weiss's warning that her son was in danger of killing
himself or someone else for more than four days and did not fol-
low up with her until at least a week after her desperate mes-
sage.257 'Weiss ultimately reached the conclusion no one could
help her or her son. She said, 'I was watching my son deteriorate
and there was absolutely no one that I could go to.""'25
IV. RESEARCH INVOLVING INVOLUNTARILY COMMITTED PATIENTS
SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO UNIFORM SPECIAL PROTECTIONS
Although IRBs generally do little to protect subjects while re-
search is in progress, they can play an important role in protect-
250. See Fabri, supra note 29, at 529.
251. Id.
252. See Susan Du, Patient Claims He Too Was Abused in University of Minnesota
Study, CITYPAGES (Minn.) (May 8, 2015), http://www.citypages.com/newslpatient-claims-
he-too-was-abused-in-university-of-minnesota-study-6550205.
253. Baillon, supra note 86.
254. Id.
255. LEGIS. AUDITOR REP., supra note 33, at 17.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 18.
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ing involuntarily committed patients at the protocol approval
stage by sharply limiting their recruitment. As discussed above,
review boards should restrict the use of these patients under the
generally applicable principles of informed consent and fair sub-
ject selection found in Subpart A of the Common Rule. But even
when federal rules apply-or when research entities voluntarily
commit to following them-these broad general principles give re-
searchers and IRBs too little guidance and too much latitude re-
garding what protections are required for involuntarily commit-
ted patients. This leaves researchers free to argue that it is
ethically acceptable to include these patients in a wide range of
research, citing the lack of express prohibitions of this recruit-
ment.
Indeed, in the T.D. case, the Office of Mental Health defended
its grossly inadequate rules all the way to the state's highest
court, and a slew of research organizations also filed amicus
briefs defending these regulations.259 The University of Minnesota
likewise vigorously defended Dr. Olson's recruitment of Marking-
son for more than a decade, both in court and in the press.26 ° Uni-
versity officials only acknowledged the impropriety of Marking-
son's recruitment after two independent investigations issued
scathing reports condemning the researchers' conduct.26' Even af-
ter one of those reports stated flatly that "the fear of being sub-
jected to an involuntary legal process for perceived noncoopera-
tion.., is an overwhelming barrier to voluntariness." '262 The
university's Associate Vice President for Research continues to
defend its treatment of Robert Huber, who was recruited while
involuntarily confined under a seventy-two-hour hold, writing:
[T]he enrollment of the participant [Huber] in the trial took place in
2007, before the passing of the 2009 legislation by the State of Min-
nesota relative to the practice of recruiting patients undergoing a
259. T.D. v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 177 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (noting the amicus briefs defending these regulations).
260. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 100.
261. Susan Du, U of _Ms Tone on Dan Markingson Changes Drastically After Legisla-
tive Auditor's Report, CITYPAGES (Minn.) (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.citypages.comlnews/
u-of-ms-tone-on-dan-markingson-changes-drastically-after-legislative-auditors-report-65
33046.
262. AAHRPP REP., supra note 33, at 67. The report further noted that the risk of coer-
cion is heightened when, as in the recruitment of Robert Huber, "the principal investigator
is also the treating physician and thus has the power to initiate the individual's involun-
tary confinement." Id.
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stay of commitment. There also was not (and still is not) a national
regulation in 2007 relative to this practice. This practice, therefore,
was considered acceptable at the time of the participant's enrollment
in this trial and appears to remain allowable under Minnesota
law.
263
Both the Department of Health and Human Services and the
Federal Bureau of Prisons have long recognized that prisoners
require additional, explicit protections against coercion and ex-
ploitation, which these agencies have implemented through regu-
lations that restrict their recruitment. 64 Although involuntarily
committed patients are similarly situated to prisoners, they do
not have the same explicit protections, leaving them vulnerable to
abuses. Accordingly, the Common Rule's protections for prisoners
should be extended to these patients, and the expanded rule's
reach should cover all human subjects research.
A. The Common Rule's Definition of Prisoner Should Be
Expanded To Include Involuntarily Committed Patients
The Common Rule recognizes that prisoners need additional
safeguards because they "may be under constraints because of
their incarceration which could affect their ability to make a truly
voluntary and uncoerced decision whether or not to participate as
subjects in research.""26 Accordingly, Subpart C of the Common
Rule extends special research protections to prisoners, sharply
restricting the types of studies for which they may be recruited as
subjects and providing additional procedural requirements. 66
However, the rule defines "prisoner" narrowly, as "[a]ny individu-
al involuntarily confined or detained in a penal institution.267
Thus, because patients confined by civil commitment orders are
263. Letter from Pamela Webb to Carl Elliott (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.scribd.com
/document/297005044[Pamela-webb-Research-Compliance-Office-Response-to-Carl-Eliott
-Regarding-Robert-Huber-and-Bifeprunox-Study. This defense is all the more striking giv-
en that the university has implicitly recognized the impropriety of recruiting patients un-
der 72-hour holds by voluntarily suspending this practice. Id.
264. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.300-306 (2016); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF
PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT No. 6031.04, PATIENT CARE § 45 (2014). See generally U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, PROGRAM STATEMENT No. 1070.07,
SUBMISSION AND PROCESSING OF PROPOSAL § 10 (1999) (discussing the general procedure
for acceptance of a research proposal).
265. 45 C.F.R. § 46.302 (2016).
266. Id. §§ 46.301-306.
267. Id. § 46.303(c) (emphasis added).
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not detained in penal institutions, they are not considered prison-
ers under the Common Rule.
In its 2007 report, the Institute of Medicine recognized that the
Common Rule's definition of "prisoner" excludes some populations
that are subject to the same pressures as inmates of correctional
facilities. The Institute recommended expanding Subpart C's pro-
tections "to the fuller population of individuals who are under re-
stricted liberty and, therefore, face potentially greater risks than
the general population when participating in research., 268 Howev-
er, the Institute stopped short of including civilly committed men-
tal patients in its proposed expanded definition. Although the au-
thors emphasized that "these groups face very similar circum-
stances and that very strong ethical safeguards are required" for
both populations, they concluded that the special circumstances
of patients under civil commitment orders were outside the scope
of their charge and warranted separate consideration.269
Patients confined to the state's custody through civil commit-
ment proceedings merit the same protections as persons incarcer-
ated through the criminal justice system. As described above,
these patients are vulnerable in the same ways as prisoners. The
fact that they are confined through a civil process rather than
through the criminal justice system has no bearing on their sus-
ceptibility to unethical treatment.
Extending the protections of Subpart C to civilly committed pa-
tients would substantially mitigate their vulnerability to coercion
and exploitation. Subpart C sets a default rule that research on
prisoners is not permitted unless it involves (1) "the possible
causes, effects, and processes of incarceration and of criminal be-
havior," (2) "prisons as institutional structures or of prisoners as
incarcerated persons," (3) "conditions particularly affecting pris-
oners as a class," or (4) "practices, both innovative and accepted,
which have the intent and reasonable probability of improving
the health or well-being of the subjects.""27 The first two catego-
ries of research are only permitted if "the study presents no more
than minimal risk and no more than inconvenience to the sub-
268. IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 101.
269. Id. at 26 n..
270. 45 C.F.R. § 46.306 (2016).
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jects.,,17' Research on conditions particularly affecting prisoners as
a class "may proceed only after the Secretary [of HHS] has con-
sulted with appropriate experts, including experts in penology
medicine and ethics, and published notice, in the Federal Regis-
ter, of his intent to approve such research. 272
Subpart C also contains special requirements regarding IRB
membership and approval. In addition to requiring that IRBs ap-
prove each research project involving prisoners individually, IRBs
for prisoner research must include at least one member that is ei-
ther a prisoner or "a prisoner representative with appropriate
background and experience to serve in that capacity. ' 73 To ap-
prove a study on prisoners, the IRB must conclude that the re-
search proposal not only meets the generally applicable Common
Rule requirements, but several additional criteria as well.274 For
example, IRBs must be assured that parole boards will not con-
sider prisoners' consent or refusal to participate in research when
making parole decisions and that each prisoner is clearly in-
formed of this in advance. 7 ' To protect against exploitation, IRBs
must also find that "[t]he risks involved in the research are com-
mensurate with risks that would be accepted by nonprisoner vol-
unteers. 276 In addition to obtaining IRB approval for research
protocols involving prisoners, researchers must also obtain certi-
fication from the Office of Human Research Protections that the
proposed study fits one of the categories of permitted research
and the ethical requirements have been met.277
Limiting research on involuntarily committed patients to stud-
ies involving minimal risks would substantially allay concerns
about the voluntariness of these patients' consent. Researchers
must still take pains to ensure that patients understand they
have the right to refuse to participate in the research without fac-
ing adverse consequences.17' But if some patients still feel pres-
sured to consent-e.g., out of a desire to appear reasonable to au-
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. § 46.304(b).
274. Id. § 46.305(a).
275. Id. § 46.305(a)(6).
276. Id. § 46.305(a)(3).
277. Id. § 46.306(a); IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 81 ('This certification step adds an
average of 3-4 weeks to the review process.").
278. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(8) (2016).
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thorities or otherwise curry their favor-at least they would not
be subjected to serious risks. In addition, Subpart C addresses
concerns about exploitation and fair subject selection by limiting
the inclusion of prisoners to research that seeks to benefit them,
either individually or as a group. The rules seek to ensure that
prisoners are not targeted merely because they are an available,
captive population, but instead because the research aims at ad-
dressing their conditions.
Although we endorse and expand on the Institute of Medicine's
recommendation to expand the definition of prisoner in the Com-
mon Rule, we reject the Institute's proposal to abandon Subpart
C's "categorical" approach to prisoner research.279 Subpart C sets
a default rule that bars all studies involving prisoners, with ex-
ceptions for specific categories of research. The Institute of Medi-
cine advocated replacing this approach with a "risk-benefit
framework" in which IRBs would make case-by-case assessments
of each protocol's potential benefits and harms and would "identi-
fy the particular ethical issues that each protocol raises in the
specific context of the correctional setting.""28 This approach
would give IRBs broad discretion to permit research on prisoners
whenever they determine the risks of a study are outweighed by
its potential benefits-even "where the benefit to prisoners is in-
direct and/or temporally distant." '281 Similarly, with respect to
promoting justice in the selection of research subjects, the Insti-
tute recommended abandoning Subpart C's limitation of research
on prisoners to studies that are particularly applicable to their
plight, such as studies on the effects of incarceration. 22 Rather,
under the Institute's proposal, "[i]t will be up to IRBs to deter-
mine whether there is a convincing affirmative reason for con-
ducting research in a prison setting." '283
The profound inadequacies of IRB review argue strongly
against giving them broad discretion to permit research that may
involve more serious risks and that may not be aimed at benefit-
ing prisoners either individually or as a group. Even under the
279. See IOM Report, supra note 7, at 123. See generally Reiter, supra note 1 (arguing
against the cost-benefit analysis recommended by the Institute).
280. IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 123.
281. Id. at 124.
282. Id. at 143; 45 C.F.R. § 46.306 (2016).
283. IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 124.
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more limited categorical approach currently in place, IRBs have
too often failed to protect prisoners from abuses.2" Expanding re-
view boards' discretion to allow more research on these popula-
tions would put prisoners at an even greater risk. The most effec-
tive way IRBs can protect these subjects is by limiting their
recruitment to low-risk research that is particularly relevant to
prisoners.
Notably, the Institute itself recommended maintaining categor-
ical restrictions on the use of prisoners in biomedical studies.28
The authors appear to single out these studies for special re-
strictions based on an assumption that biomedical research en-
tails greater risks for prisoners than other types of studies, such
as behavioral or epidemiological research.286 In fact, behavioral
research can include interventions posing serious risks to sub-
jects, such as studies involving "segregation or other isolated set-
tings and its effects." '287 As Keramet Reiter observed, "behavioral
modification 'experiments' can be difficult to distinguish from
punishment and from everyday prison policies. The difficulty of
detecting and defining behavioral modification experiments
makes this category of experiments ripe for abuse.""28
If strict categorical restrictions are justified when research may
pose serious risks to prisoners, then there is no reason to limit
this approach to biomedical studies. Given the difficulty of ensur-
ing voluntary consent from involuntarily confined persons, it
makes sense to limit their participation to studies involving min-
imal risks of harm. And, because these individuals are a vulnera-
ble population whose inclusion is not necessary for most studies,
it is in the interest of justice to limit their participation to studies
that require their inclusion and hold out the prospect of benefit to
this population.
We are also not persuaded by the Institute of Medicine's claim
that limiting prisoners' research participation in this way imper-
missibly violates their autonomy by denying them the opportuni-
284. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 527-28.
285. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 125.
286. See id. at 125-26.
287. Id. at 168.
288. Reiter, supra note 1, at 510.
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ty to share in the benefits of research.289 Although the categorical
approach might deprive some of these individuals of opportunities
they would welcome, that tells us nothing about the propriety of
these restrictions. Research protections are premised on the idea
that some paternalism is warranted in the context of medical re-
search because of the disparities of knowledge and power between
researchers and subjects and the history of grotesque abuses of
vulnerable people in research. Accordingly, the rules governing
human subjects research are replete with protections that limit
the circumstances under which individuals may participate in re-
search.
For example, under the Common Rule, a study cannot be ap-
proved unless an IRB determines that risks to subjects are mini-
mized and "are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if
any, to subjects, and the importance of the knowledge that may
reasonably be expected to result."9 ' Although this rule effectively
bars prospective subjects from participating in some high-risk re-
search, it does not violate these individuals' autonomy. As the
Belmont Report notes, "[t]o show lack of respect for an autono-
mous agent is... to deny an individual the freedom to act on
[her] considered judgments... when there are no compelling rea-
sons to do so."29' As the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research conclud-
ed-following a much more extensive investigation than the In-
stitute of Medicine's 292 -prisoners' vulnerability and the history of
research abuses against this population supply compelling rea-
sons to limit their recruitment.9
This is doubly true for involuntarily committed patients, whose
autonomy is severely limited in multiple ways precisely because
they have been judged unfit to make important decisions regard-
ing their own welfare.9 The vulnerability of these patients to co-
ercion and exploitation provides compelling reasons to limit their
research participation to low-risk studies that are highly relevant
to their conditions.
289. See IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 119-22.
290. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(2) (2016).
291. BELMONT REP., supra note 104, at 4 (emphasis added).
292. See Reiter, supra note 1, at 536-40.
293. See 1976 NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 102, at 6-7.
294. See supra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
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B. The Common Rule Should Be Expanded to Cover All Human
Subjects Research
Although expanding the Common Rule's definition of "prisoner"
to include involuntarily committed patients is an important first
step, it is not sufficient. Federal rules apply to only a limited sub-
set of research on prisoners, leaving many vulnerable to unethical
treatment.
The Common Rule applies only to research supported by a fed-
eral agency that has adopted the Rule and institutions that have
voluntarily committed to adhering to the Rule.9 While many
agencies have adopted portions of the Common Rule, only three
have adopted Subpart C's rules regarding prisoners."' Despite the
"history and controversy surrounding medical and pharmacologi-
cal studies in prisons" '297 that motivated the enactment of these
protections, the FDA has not adopted any similar provisions.298
While the Federal Bureau of Prisons has adopted regulations that
govern all research on prisoners in federal prisons, these rules do
not apply to individuals incarcerated in state prisons, who com-
prise the vast majority of prisoners in the United States.299
Because of these limitations, no federal rules govern research
on prisoners in state facilities that is not either supported by the
federal government or used to obtain FDA approval. Any research
outside that scope is governed by state laws and policies, which
are highly variable. For example, thirty-three states prohibit us-
ing prisoners in therapeutic biomedical research, while fifteen
permit this practice."0 Forty-five states prohibit the use of prison-
ers for nontherapeutic biomedical studies, while three permit
such research. 0 ' Forty-three states prohibit using prisoners in
nontherapeutic social or behavioral studies involving greater
than minimal risk, while five states permit this research.2
295. See supra notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
296. IOM REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
297. Id. at 125.
298. Id. at 74.
299. Id. at 89, 91.
300. Id. at 60.
301. Id.
302. Id.
20171 1089
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
Noting these serious deficiencies in existing regulations, in its
2007 report the Institute of Medicine urged that "[a]ll human
subjects research involving prisoners should be regulated by the
same ethical standards irrespective of source of funding, support-
ing agency, or type of correctional facility (federal, state, local, or
private) or program that houses the prisoner."' 3' The report called
on Congress to "mandate a uniform set of guidelines for human
research participant protection programs for research involving
prisoners.""4
The same is true with respect to involuntarily committed men-
tal patients."0 The vulnerability of these patients as research sub-
jects does not depend on a study's source of funding. Accordingly,
in addition to expanding the Common Rule's definition of "prison-
er" to include civilly committed mental patients, Congress should
act on the Institute of Medicine's call to extend the rule's protec-
tions to all research involving involuntarily confined subjects.
CONCLUSION
Recognizing prisoners' vulnerability to coercion and exploita-
tion, federal rules sharply limit the types of studies for which
prisoners may be recruited and mandate extensive procedural
protections for research involving this population. However, as
the Institute of Medicine has previously acknowledged, the feder-
al rules' narrow definition of "prisoner" excludes other groups
who are similarly vulnerable, including involuntarily committed
patients. Like prisoners, these patients' autonomy may be un-
dermined by routinely having to defer to authorities' decisions in
order to avoid punishment and gain privileges. They may also be
isolated and have little ability to report mistreatment or advocate
for their own interests. The fact that these patients' liberty is re-
stricted through civil commitment rather than criminal sentenc-
ing is irrelevant to their need for protection from unethical re-
search practices. Accordingly, federal rules should identify these
303. Id. at 6.
304. Id. at 94.
305. The Institute of Medicine Report recognized that "persons under restricted liberty
due to mental illness ... face very similar circumstances [to prisoners] and that very
strong ethical safeguards are required." Id. at 26 n.1. However, the Institute did not advo-
cate expanding the definition of "prisoner" to include these patients, noting that these
populations have special needs that warranted separate consideration. Id.
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patients as a species of prisoner, entitled to the same explicit pro-
tections.
Like other prisoners, involuntarily committed patients are also
threatened by the lack of uniform federal rules governing re-
search. The protections subjects receive across studies should not
vary according to factors that have no bearing on their need for
protection, such as the study's source of funding or the state in
which the research is conducted. Thus, in addition to extending
federal protections for prisoners to involuntarily committed pa-
tients, these rules should be amended to apply to all human sub-
jects research.
We recognize that these changes are unlikely to be implement-
ed in the near future. In the nine years since the Institute of Med-
icine urged expanding the definition of "prisoner" and broadening
the application of federal rules, neither Congress nor the De-
partment of Health and Human Services has moved toward
adopting these recommendations. Nevertheless, even in the ab-
sence of explicit federal rules, ethical principles of informed con-
sent and fair subject selection require IRBs to protect vulnerable
subjects from coercive and exploitative recruitment practices. Re-
gardless of federal intransigence, IRBs should extend to involun-
tarily committed patients the same protections afforded to pris-
oners.
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